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SELECTIVE ABORTION BANS: THE BIRTH OF A NEW STATE 
COMPELLING INTEREST 
Tori Gooder 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Roe v. Wade is one of the most notorious cases in American 
history because it established that a woman has a constitutional right 
to choose to have an abortion.1 Ever since this landmark case, the 
Supreme Court has attempted to outline a jurisprudence that protects 
this constitutional right, while acknowledging various state 
interests—which has proved to be a difficult task. Because there are 
few Supreme Court cases regarding abortion jurisprudence, the lower 
courts have faced, and will continue to face, an uphill battle 
concerning how a state may regulate this constitutional right to obtain 
an abortion.  
As of September 16, 2018, at least twelve states have enacted 
some type of selective abortion ban, all of which prohibit a physician 
from performing an abortion on a woman if her reason for obtaining 
the abortion is based on the sex, race, and/or genetic disability of the 
fetus. Because of differing interpretations of Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, and the most recent Supreme Court decisions, Gonzales v. 
Carhart and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, it is unclear 
whether these selective abortion bans will fail under Casey’s undue 
burden standard.2 However, considering the Court’s apparent dislike 
for absolute bans on pre-viability abortions in Casey, many of the 
broader selective abortion bans are likely to be held 
unconstitutional—as shown by the Indiana Southern District Court 
overturning Indiana’s Sex Selective and Disability Abortion Ban.3  
This article explores the United States’ complicated abortion 
jurisprudence and its implications that the Supreme Court may be 
open to a new state compelling interest to weigh against a woman’s 
right to an abortion. Part II of this article analyzes how the 
constitutional right to an abortion developed from Roe v. Wade to 
Whole Woman’s Health.4 In addition, this section examines the 
 
 1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
 2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 3. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp. 
3d 859, 866-67 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
 4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116; Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2292. 
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different state selective abortion bans enacted throughout the country 
and the challenges these statutes have encountered in the lower 
courts—including the American Civil Liberties Union’s (“ACLU”) 
recent complaint filed against Ohio’s selective Down syndrome 
abortion ban. Part III investigates the recent trend from states with 
selective abortion bans to establish discrimination as a new 
compelling state interest in regulating abortions pre-viability, and the 
constitutional muster this trending interest holds. Then, this article 
examines the new prenatal technology and the opportunities it 
provides for a completely new compelling state interest in the 
abortion discussion—prohibition of abortion as a tool for eugenics. 
Finally, the article discusses Ohio’s selective Down syndrome 
abortion ban and the Ohio statute’s ability to satisfy Casey’s undue 
burden analysis.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, a woman has a constitutional right to choose to have 
an abortion.5 Ever since Roe granted a woman the right to obtain an 
abortion, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the colliding interests 
between the woman’s right and particular state interests. For 
purposes of this article, the evolution of abortion jurisprudence will 
set up the framework to understand the current wave of selective 
abortion bans developing in state legislation. Many states have 
enacted selective abortion bans to prohibit a woman from obtaining 
an abortion, if the reason for the abortion is based on the fetus’ sex, 
race, or a diagnosis of disability. While challenges to the 
constitutionality of these selective abortion bans are scarce in some 
states, other courts have held the bans unconstitutional or temporarily 
enjoined enforcement, while further litigation is pending. As of 
March 23, 2018, Ohio joined the trend and enacted a selective 
abortion ban, specifically prohibiting the performance of an abortion 
on a woman whose reasons for the abortion are based on a fetus’ 
diagnosis for Down syndrome or another disability.  
A. Abortion Jurisprudence 
While the Constitution does not explicitly mention the right to 
privacy, the Court has long recognized a fundamental right to 
 
 5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. 
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personal privacy lurking in the shadows of the Constitution.6 In a 
variety of contexts and cases, the Court, or individual Justices, have 
found this “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas 
or zones of privacy,”7 to exist within the First Amendment,8 the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments,9 the Ninth Amendment,10 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.11 However, the bulk of the right to privacy 
jurisprudence is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This is not because the Due Process Clause mentions 
privacy, but because it prohibits the state from depriving anyone of 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”12  
1. Historical Context to the Right to Privacy 
Historically, the Court has found the word “liberty” within the Due 
Process Clause to encompass certain decisions and activities 
considered “fundamental.”13 Whenever the Court deems these liberty 
interests sufficiently “fundamental,” the state’s regulation of these 
rights “may be justified only by a compelling interest, and legislative 
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate 
state interests at stake.”14 
The Court concretely defined this right to privacy in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.15 In Griswold, the Supreme Court held a Connecticut 
statute prohibiting any person from using any drug or article to 
prevent conception in violation of the right to marital privacy 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.16 Although neither the 
Constitution nor the Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees a right to 
privacy, the Court found the Bill of Rights to have “penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give life and 
substance,” that warrant a zone of privacy around certain personal 
 
 6. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 7. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
 8. Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (holding statutes making mere private 
possession obscene material in the privacy of an individual’s home a crime in violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
 9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (finding the Fourth and Fifth Amendments allows an 
individual to “harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy’”). 
 10. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 11. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that parents have a fundamental right to 
the personal private choice of education for their children). 
 12. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.  
 14. Id. at 155. 
 15. Griswold , 381 U.S. at 479. 
 16. Id. at 486. 
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choices held to be fundamental.17 In the past, the Court has extended 
this privacy right to activities relating to procreation,18 family 
relationships,19 child rearing, and education.20  
Drawing from these past cases, the Court once again expanded the 
privacy right to include the personal choice between a married couple 
to use contraceptives or not.21 The Court in Griswold found the 
state’s interest in regulating the use of contraceptives swept 
“unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade[d]” the zone of privacy 
that protects marital intimacy.22 Soon after Griswold, the Court 
naturally extended this privacy right to decide “whether to bear or 
beget a child” to all individuals—whether single or married—in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird.23  
2. The Right to an Abortion 
Both Griswold and Eisenstadt set up the Supreme Court to decide 
Roe v. Wade in 1973, expanding the right of personal privacy to 
include a woman's decision whether to obtain an abortion.24 
However, the Court held this right was not absolute, but “must be 
considered against important state interests in regulation.”25 In order 
to define the breadth of the state’s regulatory interests, the Court 
outlined a trimester framework to balance the state’s interest to 
protect the health of the pregnant woman and the potential of human 
life and the woman’s fundamental right to choose.26  
During the first trimester, the woman has a complete right to 
obtain an abortion and the state’s interest is not “compelling” enough 
to regulate the woman’s choice during this time.27 However, during 
the second trimester, the state’s interest grows more compelling, and 
it therefore may regulate certain aspects of abortions, as long as the 
regulations reasonably relate to the preservation and protection of 
maternal health.28 The state may completely outlaw abortions during 
 
 17. Id. at 484. 
 18. Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 19. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 20. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925). 
 21. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  
 24. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 162-63. 
 27. Id. at 163. 
 28. Id. at 165. 
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the third trimester, because the state’s interest is at its most 
“compelling point,” but there must be an exception for the life or 
health of the mother.29 
The first test for Roe’s holding was in Webster v. Reproduction 
Health Services.30 In Webster, the Court held Missouri’s statutory 
prohibition against the use of public funds, employees, and facilities 
to provide abortions to be valid in light of Roe and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 While a woman has a right 
to choose whether to obtain an abortion, that right does not extend so 
far as to require that states fund abortions.32 Nor does the 
Constitution require states to provide public access and facilities for 
the performance of abortions.33 As long as the state does not place an 
impermissible “governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who 
chooses to terminate her pregnancy,” the state may refuse to fund or 
assist abortions under Roe.34 
The essence of Roe dramatically altered in 1992, when the Court in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey shifted its analysis from the trimester 
framework to an analysis that turns on viability.35 Under Roe, the 
state was unable to interfere during the first trimester because the 
state’s interest was not compelling until viability.36 Contrastingly, the 
Court in Casey allowed state interference before viability; the caveat 
being that any regulation could not be an “undue burden” on the 
woman and still furthered a legitimate and compelling interest.37 In 
Casey, the Court rejected Roe’s trimester framework, holding that it 
“misconceive[d] the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest” and 
“undervalue[d] the State’s interest in potential life.”38 Arguably, the 
“undue burden” allowed for more freedom for the states to regulate 
before viability.39 
In Casey, the plaintiff, Planned Parenthood, challenged five 
particular provisions of a Pennsylvania statute: (1) a requirement that 
 
 29. Id.  
 30. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 31. Id. at 509. 
 32. Id. at 510. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 509. 
 35. Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal Anomaly?: 
Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of Prenatal Whole Genome 
Sequencing, 20 UNIV. OF MICH. J. OF GENDER & L. 291, 319 (2013). 
 36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (defining viability as the fetus’ capability of 
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb). 
 37. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
 38. Id. at 873. 
 39. Donley, supra note 35, at 319. 
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a woman give informed consent twenty-four hours before the 
abortion procedure; (2) a requirement that at least one parent give 
consent if the woman is a minor; (3) a requirement for the woman, if 
married, inform her husband; (4) an exception to these requirements 
for women in medical emergencies; and (5) particular record keeping 
and recording requirements for the facilities performing abortions.40 
Out of the five provisions challenged, the Court struck down only the 
spousal notification requirement.41 The Court acknowledged that the 
challenged structural mechanisms might impose some burdens on a 
woman; but as long as the state regulations are not an “undue 
burden”—that is a “substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of 
the right to choose” —the Court will uphold the provision if 
reasonably related to that state interest.42  
After Casey only three core principles of Roe survived. First and 
foremost, a woman has a right, protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, to choose to have an abortion before 
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the state.43 
Second, states have the power to restrict abortions after fetal 
viability, as long as the law contains exceptions for pregnancies that 
endanger the life or health of the mother.44 Third, states have 
“legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting 
the health of the woman and the life of the fetus.”45 Leaving the rest 
of Roe behind, the Court in Casey held that an undue burden exists, 
and a provision is invalid, “if its purpose or effect is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
before the fetus attains viability.”46 
3. The Abortion Right Post-Casey 
In the wake of Casey, few abortion cases have made it to the 
Supreme Court, and for this reason, there is little Supreme Court 
jurisprudence to help the lower courts interpret the undue burden 
analysis.47 Both Stenberg v. Carhart and Gonzales v. Carhart 
involved state prohibitions on the use of the dilation and extraction 
 
 40. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
 41. Id. at 879. 
 42. Id. at 877-78. 
 43. Id. at 846. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 878. 
 47. Donley, supra note 35, at 320. 
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abortion procedure (also known as partial-birth abortion).48 Stenberg 
involved a Nebraska statute that criminalized performance of “partial 
birth abortions.”49 The Court held the statute was unconstitutional 
under the Casey undue burden analysis for two specific reasons. 
First, the Court found it was an undue burden to prohibit “partial 
birth abortion” procedures without a health exception for the 
woman.50 Second, the Court held the Nebraska statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because the language covered another 
dominant abortion procedure, D&E.51 The Court noted that if the 
statute was to be interpreted as a prohibition on both the “partial birth 
abortion” and the D&E procedure, then “the result is an undue 
burden upon a woman’s right to make an abortion decision.”52 
Just seven years after the Court decided Stenberg, the federal 
government enacted the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.53 Similar to 
the Nebraska statute in Stenberg, the federal statute criminalized the 
performance of partial-birth abortion procedures.54 However, unlike 
the Nebraska statute, the Act included a health exception to save the 
life of the mother and distinguished between the partial-birth abortion 
procedure and the D&E procedure.55 Because of these differences, 
the Supreme Court held that the Act did not place an undue burden 
on a woman and the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.56 
Further, the Court heavily relied on the government’s “legitimate and 
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life” as a 
justification for the regulations on a woman’s right to an abortion.57 
These seemingly contradictory holdings created tension around the 
undue burden analysis. Since Casey, the only regulations understood 
to be an undue burden were spousal consent requirements and bans 
on both D&E and partial-birth abortions. The country had to wait 
almost ten years before the Supreme Court added to the undue 
 
 48. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Partial 
birth abortion is a procedure where “the abortionist initiates the woman’s natural delivery process by 
causing the cervix of the woman to be dilated…the physician manually performs breech extraction of 
the body of a live fetus…[w]ith only the head of the fetus remaining in utero” where the head is then 
separated from the fetus’ body. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 959-60. 
 49. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929. 
 50. Id. at 938. 
 51. Id. at 939. D&E procedure “requires the abortionist to use instruments to grasp a portion 
(such as a foot or hand) of a developed and living fetus and drag the grasped portion out of the uterus 
into the vagina.” Id. at 958. 
 52. Id. at 946. 
 53. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 141. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 147-48. 
 57. Id. at 145.  
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burden list in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.58 In this case, 
Texas enacted a Bill that required (1) doctors performing abortions to 
obtain admitting privileges from a hospital located no further than 
thirty miles from the location the abortion was performed,59 and (2) 
the abortion facility to meet the minimum standards, under Texas 
law, for ambulatory surgical centers.60 The Supreme Court found 
both the admitting-privileges requirement and the surgical-center 
requirement to be an undue burden on a woman’s constitutional right 
to obtain an abortion.61  
However, the Court deviated from Casey’s undue burden standard, 
ever so slightly. Instead of evaluating the statutes burden on the 
woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy, the Court concentrated 
on whether the regulation granted “medical benefits sufficient to 
justify the burdens” that placed a “substantial obstacle in the path of 
the woman seeking a pre-viability abortion.”62 This slight, but 
critical, deviation from Casey emphasizes the Court’s readiness to 
observe abortion regulations more in light of the state’s interest and 
less in light of the woman’s right to choose an abortion.63 
B. The Trend Towards Anti-Discrimination Pre-viability Regulations  
Abortion jurisprudence looks very different today than it did after 
the original holding in Roe. Post-Roe cases have drastically changed 
Roe’s initial presumption that all state regulation on pre-viability 
abortions is per se unconstitutional.64 The Court in Casey paved the 
way for more state regulation on abortion care, even during the first 
trimester, as long as the state’s vested interest is in the woman’s 
health and to promote fetal life.65 As a result, both states and the 
federal government have passed a plethora of regulations on 
abortions, attempting to identify the expansive new boundaries of 
Casey’s undue burden test.66 Generally, abortion regulations by states 
and the federal government are not new, however regulations based 
on the woman’s reasons for seeking an abortion are. This section will 
 
 58. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 59. Id. at 2310. 
 60. Id. at 2314. 
 61. Id. at 2318. 
 62. Id. at 2300. 
 63. Eighteenth Annual Review of Gender and the Law: Annual Review Article: Abortion, 18 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 395, 402 (2017). 
 64. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). 
 65. Eighteenth Annual Review of Gender and the Law: Annual Review Article: Abortion, supra 
note 63, at 402. 
 66. Id. at 402-03. 
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examine closely the specific regulations states have enacted to stop 
abortions when the woman bases her abortion decision on the fetus’ 
race, sex, and/or genetic abnormality.  
In 2011, Arizona became one of the first states to enact legislation 
threatening the physicians with a class three felony if they perform 
“an abortion knowing that the abortion is sought based on the sex or 
race of the child.”67 Interestingly, the woman on “whom a sex-
selection or race-selection abortion is performed is not subject to 
criminal prosecution or civil liability.”68 Legislative history illustrates 
that some Arizona legislators were concerned that abortion providers 
were targeting African American and Hispanic women, and therefore 
enacted the legislation to protect certain populations.69 The Maricopa 
County chapter of the NAACP brought suit to enjoin the Arizona 
selective abortion bill, arguing that the legislation had a stigmatizing 
effect on African American and Hispanic women.70 However, the 
Ninth Circuit held there was insufficient standing and affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal.71 
Currently, Arizona is the only state to have enacted both race-
selective and sex-selective abortion prohibitions.72 However, many 
other states have followed Arizona’s lead and have enacted sex-
selective and/or genetic anomaly abortion bans. Currently, eight 
states prohibit sex-selective abortions at some point during 
pregnancy.73 Three states, North Dakota, Ohio, and Louisiana 
prohibit abortions for reason of genetic anomaly, such as Down 
syndrome.74 However, both Louisiana and Ohio have a court ordered 
temporary injunction on the legislation, pending litigation.75 
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arizona require counseling about perinatal 
hospice services if seeking abortion based on lethal fetal condition or 
abnormality.76 The only state to have a ban deemed unconstitutional 
 
 67. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (2011). 
 68. § 13-3603.02(E) (emphasis added). 
 69. Ariz. Leg. 2443, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). 
 70. NAACP v. Horne, 626 F. App'x 200, 201 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 71. Id. (holding that “only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal treatment’ by the 
challenged discriminatory conduct” may have standing to bring a claim for a “stigmatizing injury”). 
 72. Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-sex-or-race-
selection-or-genetic-anomaly. 
 73. Id. The eight states include Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.; See also Jessie Hellmann, Federal judge blocks Ohio Down syndrome abortion ban, THE 
HILL (Mar. 14, 2018). 
 76. Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, supra note 72. 
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is Indiana.77 
In 2017, the Indiana Southern District Court held the state’s Sex 
Selective and Disability Abortion Ban unconstitutional under Casey’s 
undue burden standard and Roe’s essential holding.78 The statute 
prohibited physicians from performing abortions if the woman sought 
an abortion: (1) “solely because of the sex of the fetus;”79 (2) “solely 
because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or has a 
potential diagnosis of Down syndrome;”80 or (3) “solely because of 
the race, color, national origin, or ancestry of the fetus.”81 The statute 
also mandated that the abortion providers inform their patients 
“Indiana does not allow a fetus to be aborted solely because of the 
fetus’ race, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, or diagnosis or 
potential diagnosis of the fetus having Down syndrome or any other 
disability.”82  
 In defending its statute, the Indiana government argued that 
technological advances have increased the state’s legitimate interest 
in protecting potential life from discrimination.83 The technological 
advances, argued the state, allows for an earlier understanding of a 
fetus’ diagnosis or potential diagnosis of Down syndrome or other 
disabilities, which in turn has led to an increase in abortions sought 
for reasons related to these disabilities.84 While the court recognized 
that the state has “legitimate interests from the outset of the 
pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a 
child,” those interests are “not strong enough to support a prohibition 
of abortion” pre-viability.85 In other words, new technological 
developments related to disability screening do not increase the 
state’s interest in protecting the potential life enough to outweigh the 
woman’s liberty interest in choosing to terminate her pregnancy prior 
to viability, at least under Roe and Casey’s holdings.86 
The court quickly dismissed the state’s second argument that the 
statute does not interfere with a right protected by Roe and Casey if 
observed through a “binary choice” interpretation.87 The state 
 
 77. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp. 
3d 859 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
 78. Id. at 867. 
 79. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-4-4 (2016). 
 80. § 16-34-4-6. 
 81. § 16-34-4-8. 
 82. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(K). 
 83. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 3d at 867. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 866 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992)). 
 86. Id. at 867-68. 
 87. Id. at 868. 
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perceived Roe and Casey to protect a woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy only if the woman does not want a child generally at that 
point in time, as opposed to terminating the pregnancy based on the 
potential characteristics of that particular child.88 The court found no 
support in Roe, Casey, or any legal authority that such a distinction 
exists in the eyes of the Supreme Court.89 Moreover, the court 
reminded the state that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a 
woman’s liberty right to terminate her pregnancy based on a right to 
privacy.90 Accordingly, the court believed this right to privacy “to 
make important, personal, and difficult decision[s] of whether to 
terminate” prohibits against state regulations on any reasons or 
factors that may influence this private decision.91 
While the Indiana Southern District Court held Indiana’s selective 
abortion ban unconstitutional, both North Dakota and Ohio have 
enacted extremely similar legislation. In 2013, North Dakota enacted 
legislation that makes it a class A misdemeanor for physicians to 
intentionally perform abortions on women who seek to have an 
abortion solely “on account of the sex of the unborn child” or 
“because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic 
abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”92 The law 
defines genetic abnormality even broader than Indiana’s statute, not 
including an exception for a “lethal fetal anomaly.”93 In its definition 
of genetic abnormality, the law includes: “any defect, disease, or 
disorder that is inherited genetically” and “any disfigurement, 
scoliosis, dwarfism, Down syndrome, albinism, amelia, or any other 
type of physical or mental disability, abnormality, or disease.”94 Yet, 
even with North Dakota’s broader definition of abnormality, the 
specific prohibition has yet to be challenged on substantive due 
process grounds—leaving the statute to cover most disability 
diagnoses recognized during prenatal testing.95  
Ohio’s legislation, effective as of March 2018, is both broader and 
narrower than Indiana and North Dakota’s prohibitions on selective 
abortions.96 Instead of prohibiting abortions based on a myriad of 
disabilities or abnormalities, the Ohio statute only bans abortions for 
 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 868-69. 
 92. N.D. Cent Code § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013). 
 93. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-4-1 (2016). 
 94. § 14-02.1-02. 
 95. § 14-02.1-02. See Donley, supra note 35, at 304. 
 96. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.10. 
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women who seek the abortion because the fetus has Down syndrome 
or potentially has Down syndrome.97 However, the language of the 
statute does not mandate that Down syndrome be the sole reason for 
the abortion, but prohibits the abortion if it is sought “in whole or in 
part” because of Down syndrome.98 Unlike both Indiana and North 
Dakota’s statute, Ohio bans the performance of abortions for reasons 
of Down syndrome, but not for reasons of sex or race.99 The ACLU 
filed a complaint on behalf of Planned Parenthood and other abortion 
providers, and recently the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio temporarily enjoined the ban.100 
III. ANALYSIS 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized compelling state 
interests such as the health of the mother and the potential life of the 
fetus. However, under particular interpretations of Gonzales and 
Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court has recently opened 
itself to consider other compelling interests. States have taken 
advantage of this opportunity and presented compelling interests such 
as eradicating discrimination and protecting the potential life from 
discrimination. Yet, another compelling interest may be even more 
persuasive and pressing to the Supreme Court: the prohibition of 
abortion as a tool for eugenics. Regardless of Ohio’s compelling 
interest in enacting the selective Down syndrome abortion ban, the 
Southern District of Ohio Court will likely find the statute 
unconstitutional under Casey’s undue burden test because of the 
broad statutory language and the substantial obstacle it places in front 
of a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion pre-viability.  
A. Discrimination as a Compelling State interest 
Under many of the selective abortion bans, it is unclear what 
exactly the state’s compelling interest is. In the recent Indiana case 
striking down Indiana’s Sex Selective and Disability Ban, the state’s 
compelling interest was protecting the potential life from 
discrimination.101 On the other hand, states have introduced more 
untraditional interests foreign to abortion jurisprudence, such as the 
 
 97. § 2919.10(B). 
 98. § 2919.10(B). 
 99. § 2919.10. 
 100. Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 749 (S.D. Ohio 2018). 
 101. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 265 F. Supp. 
3d 859, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
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elimination of discrimination based on sex, race, or disability from 
society.102 Both of these state interests have a chance of surviving 
Casey’s undue burden analysis if limited to post-viability. However, 
the interests will have much more difficulty surviving Casey if the 
bans are applicable pre-viability. Almost all of the selective abortion 
bans enacted or proposed, including Ohio and Indiana, are in effect 
throughout the woman’s pregnancy.  
Accordingly, all of the bans must satisfy the standards set for pre-
viability and post-viability state regulations provided in Casey.103 For 
post-viability selective abortion bans, satisfying Roe’s essential 
holding and Casey’s undue burden analysis is much easier: 
“subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the 
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even 
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.”104 As many of the selective abortion bans contain the word 
“solely,” a narrow post-viability selective abortion ban can satisfy 
Casey’s undue burden analysis, without any health exception for the 
mother.105 If a woman seeks an abortion because her life is in danger, 
then accordingly she is not seeking the abortion procedure solely 
based on the sex, race, or disability of the fetus, and therefore the 
procedure will not be prohibited.106 
However, pre-viability selective bans find the undue burden 
analysis more difficult to hurdle, due to the uncertainty of whether 
pre-viability bans are per se unconstitutional. The courts disagree as 
to whether Casey categorically holds all pre-viability bans as 
prohibited regardless of the undue burden analysis107 or whether 
Casey’s undue analysis places a blanket moratorium on pre-viability 
bans only if the ban heavily infringes on a woman’s ability to make 
the “ultimate decision.”108 Yet, recent abortion jurisprudence 
 
 102. Thomas J. Molony, Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selective Abortion Bans, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1089, 1109 (2014). 
 103. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007) (explaining that “[t]he abortions affected by 
the Act’s regulations take place both pre-viability and post-viability; so . . . the undue burden analysis . . 
. [is] applicable.”). 
 104. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 164-65 (1973)). 
 105. Molony, supra note 102, at 1104. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F. 3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013); MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. 
State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2017).  
 108. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1151 (D. Idaho 2013); Reprod. Health 
Servs. v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1270 (M.D. Ala. 2017); Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 
No. A-17-CV-690-LY (W.D. Tex. 2017). 
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developed in Gonzales and Whole Woman’s Health implies that a 
third interpretation may be available: the undue burden analysis 
applies to pre-viability bans, and government interests different from 
those traditionally considered—health of the mother and protection 
of potential life—are relevant in the undue burden inquiry.109  
If applying either of the first two interpretations of Casey, any 
selective abortion pre-viability ban, no matter the state’s compelling 
interest, would not survive a constitutional inquiry. Accordingly, if 
following the Ninth Circuit’s categorical approach, a pre-viability 
selective abortion “prohibition on the exercise of [the abortion] right 
is per se unconstitutional,” and thereby the state “may not proscribe a 
woman from electing abortion . . . .”110 Similarly, if applying Casey’s 
undue burden test to pre-viability selective abortion bans effect on a 
woman’s ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy, the ban would 
be invalid because it places more than “a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus,”111 but an 
“insurmountable” or “absolute” obstacle.112 
However, under the third interpretation, pre-viability selective 
abortion bans have a better chance of surviving Casey’s undue 
burden analysis. As an agitated Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her 
dissent, the Supreme Court in Gonzales took into account other 
interests when applying Casey’s undue burden test to the federal 
partial-birth abortion ban.113 The Court recognized the traditional Roe 
and Casey state interests in protecting potential life and the health of 
the mother, but it also focused on the government’s “interest in 
protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”114 
Moreover, the Court acknowledged moral and ethical concerns, 
finding the D&E procedure had the power to “devalue human 
life.”115  
Whole Woman’s Health expanded Casey’s undue burden analysis 
one-step further than Gonzales. While many pro-choice groups 
rallied behind Whole Woman’s Health’s holding, the Court’s opinion 
ever so slightly deviated from the previous interpretation of Casey’s 
 
 109. Molony, supra note 102, at 1105. 
 110. Isaacson, 716 F. 3d at 1217. 
 111. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 112. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. 
 113. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 182 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Ultimately, the 
Court admits that ‘moral concerns’ are at work, concerns that could yield prohibitions on any abortion. 
Notably, the concerns expressed are untethered to any ground genuinely serving the Government’s 
interest in preserving life.”). 
 114. Id. at 157. 
 115. Id. at 158. 
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undue burden analysis.116 In fact, the Court reframed the undue 
burden analysis illustrating its willingness to look closely at the 
particular abortion regulations in light of whether the means behind 
the regulations actually justify and serve the state’s interests.117 
Therefore, since the Texas surgical center and admitting privileges 
requirements produced a “substantial obstacle in the path of women 
seeking a pre-viability abortion” without “confer[ing] medical 
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens,” the Court held the statute 
impermissible.118 Together, Gonzales and Whole Woman’s Health 
illustrate the Court’s willingness to apply Casey’s undue burden test 
broadly to pre-viability abortion regulations as long as the state 
regulation is substantial enough to justify and serve a compelling 
state interest different from those established in Roe and Casey, such 
as “protecting the potential life from discrimination”119 or eradicating 
discrimination in society.  
Applying this third interpretation of Casey to a state’s interest in 
protecting the potential life from discrimination is bound to fail the 
undue burden test. Not because the state interest is not legitimate, but 
because protecting the “potential life from discrimination” is the 
same state interest addressed in Roe and Casey, just repackaged. The 
Court recognizes the “State has legitimate interests from the outset of 
the pregnancy . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child,” but 
refuses to allow that particular state interest to create a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy 
prior to viability.120 Further, the Court in Roe refuses to address 
whether “life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live 
birth,” and therefore defines viability to be the time when the state’s 
interest may become “compelling.”121 Accordingly, if the Court does 
not recognize, or at least take a stance, on life at conception, then 
discrimination cannot attach to a fetus because the Court does not 
recognize a fetus as a legal person.122 
On the other hand, a selective abortion ban grounded in a state’s 
interest to eradicate discrimination in society might survive the post 
Gonzales and Whole Woman’s Heath expansion of Casey’s undue 
burden test. The state’s interest in ending discrimination might be a 
 
 116. Eighteenth Annual Review of Gender and the Law, supra note 63, at 402. 
 117. Id.; Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
 118. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 119. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp. 
3d 859, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
 120. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 163 (1973). 
 122. Id. at 158. 
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new development in the arena of abortion jurisprudence. However, 
this interest is a familiar and recognized state interest in the 
constitutional realm of freedom of association for expressive 
purposes.123  
In a line of freedom of association cases, the Court pondered 
whether public accommodation statutes that prohibited 
discrimination based on race, sex, sexual orientation, or religion 
unconstitutionally violated a group’s associational rights.124 The 
Court applied an “undue burden-like balancing test,” instead of strict 
scrutiny, in all of the cases.125 In two of the cases, the Court held that 
the state’s interest in eliminating sex discrimination was compelling 
and justified the statute that infringed on the group’s associational 
rights.126 Importantly, the Court in Roberts v. United States, Board of 
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, and Boy 
Scouts of American v. Dale only permits infringement in expressive 
associational rights when the infringement is slight and when the 
state has a compelling interest, such as eradication of discrimination 
that is “unrelated to the suppression of ideas.”127  
Applying this same line of reasoning, there might be a reasonable 
argument that a state’s compelling interest in eradicating 
discrimination justifies a slight infringement on a woman’s right to 
choose.128 There is ample room to attack this argument, beginning 
with the notion that a selective abortion ban pre-viability is far from a 
slight infringement. Yet, there is a possibility that a narrow selective 
abortion ban with the infringement on a woman’s right to choose 
tailored to the word “solely” might have constitutional muster in light 
of a state’s compelling interest. The woman’s choice is only 
infringed upon if her decision to terminate her pregnancy is “solely” 
based on the fetus’ sex, race, or potential disability, and therefore if 
any other reason is presented for the abortion, then the woman’s right 
to choice trumps the state’s compelling interest. Drawing on the 
eradication of discrimination as a compelling state interest, there 
 
 123. Molony, supra note 102, at 1118. 
 124. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Board of Directors of Rotary 
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 530 U.S. 
640 (2000). 
 125. Molony, supra note 102, at 1118-1119. 
 126. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29 (holding that a state public accommodation statute did not 
violate the constitutional rights of the United States Jaycees by mandating the group admit women as 
full voting members); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 (holding that a state public accommodation statute did 
not violate the constitutional associational rights of Rotary International by requiring the group open its 
membership to women, and not exclusively to men); Dale, 530 U.S. at 640. 
 127. Molony, supra note 102, at 1123; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 128. Molony, supra note 102, at 1129. 
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might be an even more powerful interest for the state to put forth: the 
prohibition of abortion as a tool for eugenics.  
B. A New Compelling State Interest  
While the eradication of discrimination is a worthwhile state 
interest and has some merit, there is an even more powerful interest 
that the Court, and the world in general, has already wrestled with for 
centuries: eugenics. A term coined in 1883 by Francis Galton, 
eugenics is a term used to refer to the practice of improving the 
human race by controlling reproduction.129 Although connected most 
notoriously to the Nazi regime, eugenics was a movement founded in 
the United States at the turn-of-the-century.130 The American 
eugenics movement sponsored “forced sterilization of criminals and 
the [mentally disabled], selective ethnic restrictions on immigration, 
and even euthanasia for those deemed unfit to live.”131  
The eugenics movement colors America’s history. In the famous 
words of Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, “three generations of 
imbeciles are enough,” justified the use of compulsory sterilization 
against a “patient afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, 
imbecility.”132 Not only did the Supreme Court support the use of 
eugenics, but the federal and state legislatures did as well. In 1924, 
Congress enacted the Federal Immigration Restriction Act to curb the 
“rising tide of defective germ-plasm” carried by particular suspected 
classes of migrants journeying from Southern and Eastern Europe.133 
States, during the 1970s, required genetic screening programs of 
African Americans for sickle cell anemia (an inherited disease 
commonly developed in people of African descent).134  
As genetic technology continues to develop, a modern form of 
eugenics becomes more and more plausible. Just recently, in 2010, a 
major change in prenatal genetic testing occurred, allowing women to 
obtain a non-invasive prenatal genetic test as earlier as ten weeks into 
their pregnancy.135 This prenatal genetic test provides for hundreds 
and potentially thousands of traits with a single blood test, thereby 
 
 129. Martin S. Pernick, Eugenics and Public Health in American History, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
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 132. 274 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1927). 
 133. Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization 
to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (1996). 
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providing women with the ability to find out any known genetic 
markers their fetus contains, or may contain.136 These known genetic 
markers span from Down syndrome, Tay Sachs, and Cystic Fibrosis 
to breast cancer, heart disease, and diabetes.137 Not only does 
prenatal genetic testing increase the mass amount of information 
women have available to them regarding their fetus’ genetics, but the 
prenatal genetic testing allows women to have this information as 
early as ten weeks into their pregnancy.138  
As Gonzales illustrated, the Supreme Court is open to other 
legitimate state interests at play in abortion jurisprudence, such as the 
“integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”139 Moreover, the 
Court in Gonzales recognized Congress’ interest to create specific 
prohibitions against abortions that “implicate additional ethical and 
moral concerns” and to draw “a bright line that clearly distinguishes 
abortion and infanticide.”140 Therefore, the Court looked much 
further than the traditional interests of the state—the protection of the 
potential life and the health of the mother—to justify the regulations. 
The Court’s logic in Gonzales already connects abortion and 
infanticide, a form of eugenics, and appears to be only a step away 
from justifying selective abortion bans under the banner of 
prohibiting the use of eugenics. 
The potential state interest in preventing the use of abortion as a 
means of eugenics is a compelling interest both before and after 
viability. According to both Roe and Casey, the state interest in 
protecting the potential life increases as the fetus develops, to the 
point that it eventually outweighs the woman’s abortion right, with 
the exception for “the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.”141 Yet, the potential state interest in preventing abortion as a 
means of eugenics does not increase or decrease in correlation with 
the viability of the fetus. The prevention of eugenics is just as 
important an interest pre-viability as it is post-viability, and therefore 
begs the question whether the prevention of eugenics as a compelling 
state interest outweighs the woman’s abortion right from the moment 
genetic testing provides the sex, race, or potential disabilities of the 
fetus. 
The Court’s application of Casey’s undue burden test in Whole 
 
 136. Id. at 297-98. 
 137. Id. at 301. 
 138. Id. at 302. 
 139. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). 
 140. Id. at 158. 
 141. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 163-164 (1973). 
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Woman’s Health also supports the idea that a new compelling interest 
can outweigh a women’s privacy interest pre-viability. Reframing the 
undue burden analysis in the dicta of the opinion, the Court exposes 
its willingness to allow the ends to justify the means. While the 
selective abortion ban might place a “substantial obstacle in the path 
of women seeking a pre-viability abortion,” if the selective abortion 
ban “confers [medical] benefits sufficient to justify the burdens,” 
then the ban might be justified.142 Accordingly, the benefits must 
derive from the state’s interests, and must outweigh the burdens 
imposed upon a woman. The Court is required to “consider the 
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits 
those laws confer.”143  
Appropriately, if the benefits to preventing eugenics justify the 
burden imposed on the woman’s privacy interest, then a selective 
abortion ban just might survive the undue burden test. Obviously, 
benefits include the specific moral and ethical values of protecting 
the breeding out of certain sexes, races, and disabilities. The Court 
has already recognized ethical and moral concerns as a compelling 
state interest worth weighing in the abortion analysis. The D&E 
procedure present in Gonzales had the power to “devalue human 
life,”144 which the Court found to be a moral and ethical interest the 
state may depend on, in addition to other compelling interests such as 
ethics and integrity of medical professionals. Clearly, eugenics and 
its history in America illustrates the ethical and moral concerns in 
allowing individuals or governments to have the power to “devalue 
human life” by deeming what races, sexes, or genetic disabilities are 
worth bringing to life.  
More broadly, selective abortion regulations can benefit society by 
protecting public health and combating discrimination against 
protected classes. Protecting America’s public health can benefit 
society by preventing the grave social consequences of an 
unbalanced male to female ratio, which is already an issue in other 
parts of the world.145 The protection of public health may also 
include prohibiting individuals from having the power to determine 
what characteristics are desirable in a potential human being, and 
thereby having the extraordinary power to filter particular types of 
qualities. In terms the Court already recognizes, the “integrity and 
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ethics of the medical profession” is hindered when medical 
professionals are given not only the responsibility of disclosing to a 
patient the prenatal genetic testing results that include a potential 
disability or disease, but also the responsibility of directly performing 
an abortion on the fetus, knowing the reasons for its termination. If 
the integrity and ethics of medical professionals proved compelling 
enough in Gonzales to justify the prohibition of partial-birth 
procedures, then it is plausible that the same justification may be 
upheld for prohibiting selective abortions.  
The Court has already deemed state’s interests in combating 
discrimination against protected classes to be a benefit to society, as 
seen in the Roberts, Duarte, and Dale line of cases, and therefore a 
compelling governmental interest to override the particular 
fundamental liberties of expressive associational rights. Historically, 
eugenics has been used to discriminate against certain types of 
individuals based on their race, mental capabilities, and sex. The 
Supreme Court itself held that a state may not use eugenics because 
“invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of 
individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and 
equal laws,” and because the sterilization “perpetuate[s] the 
discrimination which we have found to be fatal.”146 Similarity, in 
Loving v. Virginia, many eugenic enthusiasts supported and helped 
enact the 1924 Virginia Racial Integrity Act to combat the “threat to 
the health of the while gene pool.”147 The Court held the state’s 
miscegenation statute as unconstitutional in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause because of its discrimination and classification on 
the basis of race.148 
Clearly, the Court has already recognized the connection between 
the use of eugenics and discrimination. Using the same line of 
reasoning, when a state has a compelling interest, such as eradication 
of discrimination, “unrelated to the suppression of ideas,”149 and is 
only a slight infringement, then the statute may infringe on the 
fundamental associational rights of particular groups. Accordingly, 
this reasoning is applicable to the fundamental right of abortion as 
well: the state’s compelling interest to combat and eradicate 
discrimination, by prohibiting the use of eugenics, if unrelated to the 
actual abortion right, may be compelling enough to infringe on the 
 
 146. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 543 (1942) (prohibiting sterilization of habitual 
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fundamental right of abortion.  
The argument against the use of selective abortion legislation will 
be that the infringement on a woman’s right to abortion is not slight. 
However, if selective abortions are narrowly tailored enough to 
prohibit abortions only if based “solely” on the sex, race, or potential 
disability, then the Court might consider the infringement slight. If 
the benefits—protection of public health and eradication of 
discrimination—derived from the state’s interests in prohibiting the 
use of eugenics, outweigh the burdens imposed upon the woman’s 
abortion right, then the selective abortion bans could be justifiable. 
As prenatal genetic testing provides for information regarding the 
fetus’ potential disabilities and other attributes as earlier as ten 
weeks, the state’s compelling interest is just as heightened pre-
viability as post-viability, unlike previous state interests such as 
health of the mother and the potential life of the fetus. Considering 
the burdens selective abortion bans impose on abortion access 
together with the benefits those laws confer, it would appear that 
states’ selective abortion bans might confer a benefit that is just 
compelling enough to outweigh a woman’s abortion right. 
C. Ohio’s Down Syndrome Abortion law  
While Ohio’s Down syndrome abortion law is distinct from 
Indiana’s overruled Sex Selective and Disability Abortion Ban, the 
Ohio law will likely fail Casey’s undue burden analysis, and 
therefore violate a woman’s right to an abortion. There are two 
differences that distinguish the Ohio statute from the Indiana statute: 
(1) the prohibition on selective abortions is limited to only the 
genetic abnormality of Down syndrome and other disabilities and (2) 
the woman’s reasons for the abortion may be prohibited if based 
either wholly or in part on a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome.150 
However, these distinctions are unable to satisfy Casey’s undue 
burden analysis, even when using the third interpretation of Casey in 
light of the Gonzales and Whole Woman Health’s expansions.  
Recently, the ACLU filed a complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief to the Southern District Court of Ohio.151 The ACLU 
argues that the Ohio law “imposes an unconstitutional undue burden 
on the abortion right” and “violates the rights to liberty and privacy 
secured to [women] by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
 150. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.10. 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution.”152 To make this 
determination, the Southern District Court of Ohio must decide 
whether the Ohio prohibition on abortions based, in part or in whole, 
on a diagnosis (or possible diagnosis) of Down syndrome, or another 
disability, is a “substantial obstacle in the path of the woman seeking 
a previability abortion.”153 
The Ohio statute criminalizes the performance of abortions on a 
pregnant woman if the provider has “knowledge that the pregnant 
woman is seeking the abortion, in whole or in part” because a test, 
prenatal diagnosis, or another resource indicates that the unborn child 
will have Down syndrome, or another disability.154 On the other 
hand, the Indiana statute prohibits the performance of abortions 
before or after viability if the person knows that the pregnant woman 
is seeking an abortion solely because of (1) the sex of the fetus, (2) 
the diagnosis of Down syndrome or any other disability, or (3) the 
race of the fetus.155 The Ohio statute is obviously narrower than the 
Indiana statute, criminalizing the performance of abortions only if the 
reason for the abortion is because the fetus has a diagnosis of Down 
syndrome or another disability.  
However, ironically, the Ohio statute is much more of a substantial 
obstacle to the woman’s obtainment of an abortion than the Indiana 
statute because of its use of the words “in whole or in part.”156 The 
reason for a woman to obtain an abortion only needs to be based “in 
part” on the fetus’ indication of having Down syndrome. 
Theoretically, this means that no matter how small a role a diagnosis 
played into the woman’s decision, a doctor may not perform an 
abortion. Therefore, the Ohio Southern District Court’s reasoning 
will likely be similar to the Indiana District Court, finding the 
selective abortion ban places a substantial obstacle in the path of the 
woman seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability.157 
Even if Ohio announces that the compelling interest behind the 
Down syndrome selective abortion ban is to prohibit the use of 
abortion as a tool for eugenics, the selective abortion ban will still 
likely be held unconstitutional because the infringement on a 
woman’s abortion right is not slight. However, if Ohio’s compelling 
interest was to prohibit eugenics, and the statute only prohibited the 
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reason for the abortion to be “solely” based on the fetus’ disability, 
then the statute might satisfy Casey. Applying the Court’s reasoning 
in the culmination of the Roberts, Duarte, and Dale cases, the 
infringement on a woman’s abortion right is only permitted when the 
infringement is slight and when the state’s compelling interest, such 
as prohibition of eugenics, is unrelated to the abortion right. 
Accordingly, the word “solely” would limit the infringement on the 
abortion right only to cases where the woman has absolutely based 
her abortion decision on the fetus’ diagnosis of Down syndrome and 
disclosed this absolute basis to the doctor performing the abortion.  
A Court would hold the Ohio selective abortion ban 
unconstitutional, even if the statute limited the prohibition of 
selective Down syndrome abortions post-viability, because the Ohio 
law contains no exception allowing the doctor to perform the 
abortion when it is necessary to preserve the health or life of the 
mother.158 As the Court has made clear, an undue burden exists when 
the state heavily regulates abortions without a health exception for 
the woman.159 In Gonzales, the partial-birth abortion ban was valid, 
but only because the Act included a health exception to save the life 
of the mother.160 In Indiana and other states that use the language 
“solely,” a health exception is unnecessary because as long as the 
woman has another reason to base her abortion decision on, such as 
for her health or in an emergency, the statute does not limit her 
ability to do so. On the other hand, Ohio’s statute’s use of “in whole 
or in part” creates a need for the health exception. Otherwise, the 
threat to the life of the mother, or any other medical emergency, 
would be an unavailable exception to obtain an abortion, at least if 
the reasoning for the abortion also included the fetus diagnosis of 
Down syndrome or another disability. Therefore, the Ohio statute 
with no health exception for the mother, just like the statute in 
Gonzales, creates an undue burden on the woman’s right to an 
abortion.  
As repeated in all post-Casey Supreme Court abortion case law, a 
woman has a right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to choose to have an abortion before 
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the state. 
The Ohio statute clearly places a “substantial obstacle in the path of 
the woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus,” as well as a 
significant obstacle post-viability since the statute contains no health 
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exception for the woman in direct violation of Gonzales.161 If any 
woman in Ohio mentions, or even indicates, that her reasoning “in 
whole or in part” for seeking an abortion is based on the belief that 
the fetus has Down syndrome or another disability, then the doctor is 
prohibited from performing the abortion.162 Similar to Indiana’s law, 
the Ohio law takes the “ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy 
before viability” out of the woman’s hand and into the state’s.163  
Even with a compelling interest that potentially “confers [medical] 
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens,” the language of the Ohio 
statute produces much more than a slight burden on the woman’s 
right to an abortion. The Southern District Court of Ohio, therefore, 
will likely follow the Indiana court’s reasoning. No matter the state’s 
interest, it is not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion 
pre-viability. Thus, in light of Roe’s essential holding and Casey’s 
undue burden standard, the Southern District Court of Ohio will most 
likely find the Ohio selective Down syndrome ban to be an undue 
burden on a woman’s fundamental right to obtain an abortion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ohio’s Down syndrome selection abortion ban, like many other 
state’s abortion bans, is likely to fail under Casey’s undue burden 
analysis, in light of the traditionally compelling interests the Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized in abortion jurisprudence. However, 
the Court has illustrated in Gonzales that it will consider other 
interests than just the traditional state interests in the health of the 
mother and the potential life of the fetus. Further, Whole Woman’s 
Health redirected the undue burden analysis enough to allow the 
Court to weigh the benefits and burdens of the state’s regulations 
against the woman’s abortion right. If states adopt the interest in 
prohibiting eugenics, the benefits conferred—protecting the public 
health, combating and eradicating the discrimination of protected 
classes of persons, and safeguarding the integrity and ethics of the 
medical profession—may outweigh the burden that is a slight 
infringement on a woman’s right to an abortion.  
Yet, the infringement must be slight. Selective abortion statutes 
must be narrowly tailored enough to only prohibit abortions if based 
“solely” on the sex, race, or potential disability. Then, and only then, 
will the Court consider the infringement slight. As prenatal genetic 
testing continues to develop and become more readily available 
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regarding the fetus’ potential disabilities and other attributes, the 
state’s compelling interest continues to increase both pre-viability 
and post-viability, unlike previous state interests such as health of the 
mother and the potential life of the fetus. Considering the burdens the 
selective abortion bans impose on abortion access together with the 
benefits those laws confer, it would appear that state’s selective 
abortion bans might confer a benefit that is just compelling enough to 
outweigh a woman’s abortion right.  
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